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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to extend previous research into the factors that have a 
significant influence on the demand for voluntary audit in small companies in the UK.  
The study is a regression analysis of data from a random sample of 790 companies with a 
turnover up to £4.8m that was collected via a postal questionnaire in 2003. 
 
Despite the finding that 57% of companies supported the government’s proposal in 2003 
to raise the turnover threshold to the EU level of £4.8m, 42% predicted that they would 
have a voluntary audit if they were exempt.  The study demonstrates that the quantitative 
criteria used in company law are not sufficient surrogates for the costs versus benefits of 
an independent audit and suggests a theoretical model that includes additional qualitative 
factors.  Turnover (but not balance sheet total) is influential, but the likelihood of the 
directors choosing a voluntary audit also increases if certain management and agency 
factors are present.  The management factors relate to the directors’ perceptions that the 
audit provides a check on accounting records and systems, improves the quality of the 
financial information and has a positive effect on the company’s credit rating score. The 
agency factors are the presence of non-family shareholders, external shareholders and 
lenders.   
 
These findings add to our knowledge by testing the results of previous research with a 
new and larger sample of companies and identifying new predictors of the demand for a 
voluntary audit (the view that the audit has a positive effect on the credit rating score and 
agency relationships with external shareholders).  Since lenders and creditors have the 
economic power to ensure that their needs are met, it is important that future regulation 
protects the needs of shareholders requiring the additional assurance of an independent 
audit. 
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1. Introduction 
 
For many years in the UK, all companies, apart from dormant companies, were required 
to have an independent audit.  This external examination or, and expression of opinion on 
the statutory accounts demonstrates ‘the completeness, accuracy and validity of 
transactions which, when aggregated, make up the financial statements’ (Power, 1997, p. 
24).  However, in 1994 the Fourth Directive introduced changes that allowed EU member 
states to exempt small companies from the statutory audit.  In the UK, the government set 
the qualifying thresholds below the EU maxima, but revised them upwards several times 
until in 2003 they matched the EU ceilings.  Throughout the nine-year period, there was 
considerable controversy over the appropriateness of the thresholds and this question is a 
key part of the wider ‘big GAAP/little GAAP’ debate on the need for different sets of 
generally accepted accounting principles for large and small entities.  Until recently, these 
debates have been dominated by anecdotal evidence from policy-makers and the 
accountancy profession, and the views of company directors have been largely ignored.  
This is an important omission as the directors are the main users of the statutory accounts 
(Page, 1984; Carsberg, Page, Sindall and Waring, 1985; Barker and Noonan, 1996), 
which are used for a range of internal and external purposes (Collis and Jarvis, 2000 and 
2002; Collis 2003a).  Their views are vital as they must weigh up the costs and benefits of 
an independent audit. 
   
The present study contributes to our knowledge of directors’ views and the decisions they 
make regarding the audit.  It analyses data from a survey of small companies (Collis, 
2003b) that was commissioned by the DTI during consultations over proposals to raise 
the exemption level to the EU maxima.
1
  The paper focuses on the factors that have a 
significant influence on whether companies will have a voluntary audit and extends the 
model developed by Collis, Jarvis and Skerratt (2004), which suffered from two 
limitations.  First, sampling frame used was not fully representative of companies with a 
turnover of less than £0.5m; and second, there have been significant increases in the 
exemption level since the survey was conducted in 1999, which mean the tranche of 
companies now classified as small must be extended.  In addition to these sample-related 
factors, a further motivation for the present study is to extend the model by including 
additional explanatory variables. 
 
Section 2 of this paper reviews the development of differential audit requirements and the 
literature that provides the theoretical framework for the study.  Section 3 describes the 
methodology, which paves the way for an examination and discussion of the results in 
Section 4.  The final section draws conclusions about the implications of the findings. 
 
2. Background to the study 
 
2.1 Development of differential audit requirements 
 
Differential financial reporting in terms of size developed in the UK in the early 1980s, 
when the burgeoning number of smaller entities in the economy led to small companies
2
 
being offered a regulatory framework with some simplifications and concessions (little 
                                                 
1
 Therefore, the commissioning of the study supported the government’s stance on evidence-based 
policymaking (Cabinet Office, 1999). 
2
 Most of the requirements of company law also apply to limited liability partnerships, a new form of 
business vehicle permitted since April 2001. 
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GAAP).  In 1994 the EC Fourth Company Law Directive permitted national governments 
to dispense with the requirement for smaller entities to undergo an audit.  In the UK, this 
led to an amendment of section 249A of the Companies Act 1985 (SI 1994/1935) to 
exempt a company that had a turnover up to £90,000 (lower than the EU maximum), 
balance sheet total up to £1.4m and up to 50 employees, unless a full audit was required 
by shareholders holding at least 10% of share capital.  A company with a turnover of 
between £90,000 and £350,000 had to have an accountant’s report.  This was dropped in 
1997 when the turnover threshold was raised to £350,000 (SI 1997/936) and companies 
were also required to qualify as ‘small’ for the purpose of filing abbreviated accounts.3  
Under sections 247 and 247A of the Companies Act 1985, apart from certain companies 
that are excluded for reasons of public interest, a company qualifies as ‘small’ if it meets 
any two of three basic size tests shown in Table 1.  Apart from a newly incorporated 
company, the conditions must have been satisfied in two of the last three years (similar 
conditions apply to small groups). 
 
In 2000 the turnover threshold was increased to £1m (SI 2000/1430) with proposals to 
raise levels for all financial reporting purposes to the substantially higher EU maxima 
(DTI, 2000).  At the time of the study in March 2003 these were: turnover £4.8m; balance 
sheet total £2.4m; employees 50.    However, in May the EU thresholds were adjusted for 
indexation purposes to turnover £5.6m and balance sheet total £2.8m and these thresholds 
were adopted in UK law with effect from January 2004 (SI 2004/16).  This process of 
step change towards European harmonisation is summarised in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Audit exemption thresholds in the UK 1994 - 2004 
 
Criteria 1994 1997 2000 2003 
proposal 
2004 
Turnover £0.09m £0.35m £1m £4.8m £5.6m 
Balance sheet total £1.4m £1.4m £1.4m £2.4m £2.8m 
Average employees 50 50 50 50 50 
 
2.2 Size as a surrogate for costs versus benefits 
 
The government’s rationale for audit exemption is that it relieves unnecessary cost 
burdens that fall disproportionately on small companies (DTI, 1995; DTI, 1999).  Implicit 
in this argument is the notion that below a certain size, the costs outweigh the benefits 
and vice versa.  The profession’s views on the most appropriate level for audit exemption 
are diverse.  A survey conducted by the Small Practitioners Association found that ‘92% 
of accountants … supported exemption for all private, owner-managed, small limited 
companies’ (Mitchell, 1999, p. 21).  The ICAEW was reported as describing the news 
that the thresholds could be raised to the EU maxima as ‘a positive step to ease the 
burdens on business’ (Accountancy, 2003, p. 9), but others in the ICAEW argued that 
would reduce the quality of the information put on public record (Jones, 2003).  The 
ACCA was against lifting the limits, arguing that it would ‘take away the value-added 
aspect which comes with the audit’ (Beckerlegge, 1999, p.21) and raise the risk of fraud 
(Rose, 2003). 
                                                 
3
 The options set out in Section 246 of the Companies Act (as revised by SI 1997/220) allow small and 
medium-sized companies to prepare and file either full or abbreviated financial statements with the 
Registrar, but they must provide full financial statements for their shareholders.  Abbreviated accounts must 
be accompanied by a special auditors’ report, unless the company is exempt from the requirement for an 
audit by virtue of sections 249A(1) or (2) or 250 of the Companies Act 1985.  
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The number of companies taking up exemption in the early years has not been published, 
but statistics for 2002/3 show that 676,300 companies (representing 57% of companies on 
the register) had filed either full or abbreviated accounts that were audit exempt (DTI, 
2003, p. 58).  The government anticipates that raising thresholds from the 2000 levels to 
the 2004 levels would add a further 69,000 companies to the existing 822,000 companies 
classified as small (Eaglesham, 2003), although the proportion of small companies 
meeting the conditions for audit exemption is not known. 
 
Until recently, the lack of reliable and up-to-date information on the costs and the benefits 
of the audit has limited the debate to anecdotal evidence and a number of small studies 
and opinion polls.  Since the regulatory framework for financial reporting by small 
companies is currently country-specific and highly dynamic, it can be argued that the 
results of overseas studies and some of the older studies have little relevance.  Moreover, 
many of the UK studies have been based on too small a sample to permit generalisation 
(for example, Page, 1984; Freedman and Goodwin, 1993; Pratten, 1998; Lin-Seouw, 
2001). 
 
A MORI survey of 176 companies (ACCA, 1998) forecast that approximately 40% of 
companies with a turnover between £350,000 and £1.5m were likely to opt for audit 
exemption if the threshold were raised to a speculative level of £1.5m.  However, in 1999, 
a survey of the directors of 385 companies with a turnover up to £4.2m
4
 (the EU 
threshold at that time) found that 29% would forgo the audit if they had a choice, whilst 
63% would have a voluntary audit (Collis and Jarvis, 2000, Collis, 2003a).  This suggests 
that for the majority of companies of this size, the benefits of having the accounts audited 
outweigh the costs. 
 
2.3 Management and agency factors 
 
Further analysis of the 1999 survey data by Collis et al. (2004) provided empirical 
evidence of several factors that influence the demand for a voluntary audit:  ‘It was found 
that turnover alone could represent size, but that size was less important than the 
directors’ perceptions of the value of the audit in terms of improving the quality of 
information and providing a check on internal records.  Agency relationships with owners 
and lenders were also found to be significant influences on the demand for the audit’ 
(Collis et al., 2004, p. 87). It was also found that the director’s educational profile was 
also influential. 
 
Previous research shows that the main recipients of the statutory accounts of small 
companies are lenders, the Inland Revenue, managers, creditors and customers (Collis 
and Jarvis, 2000).  This suggests that management may want the accounts audited to 
provide assurance to these internal and external users.  An independent check on internal 
controls reduces the chance of material error.  In small companies inherent risk (the 
likelihood of a material misstatement arising) and control risk (the likelihood of the 
accounting control detecting any material misstatement) may be high.  Agency theory 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976) suggests that the directors will be willing to bear the cost of 
the audit to support agency relationships with principals where there is information 
asymmetry.  In small companies, a principal is anyone who is distant from the actions of 
                                                 
4
 The study achieved a 17% response rate from 2,287 companies. 
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management and is unable to verify them, such as external shareholders, lenders and 
creditors; information asymmetry may also be present amongst internal shareholders if 
they lack the necessary skills to interpret financial information (Power, 1997).   
 
2.4 Purpose of the study 
 
The present study extends the model developed by Collis et al. (2004) by including 
additional predictors and testing the revised model with a new sample of 790 companies 
with a turnover up to £4.8m (the EU threshold at the time of the survey in March 2003).  
The purpose of the study is to address the following research question: 
 
What are the factors that have a significant influence on the demand for 
the audit among companies meeting the EU size criteria for a small entity? 
 
This is divided into nine hypotheses, which are presented below in the alternate form.  
The first is based on size in the Companies Act 1985 as a surrogate for the costs versus 
benefits of the audit: 
 
H1 Ceteris paribus, the likelihood of the directors choosing a voluntary 
audit increases with size, as measured by turnover, balance sheet total 
and/or number of employees. 
 
The next five hypotheses relate to management factors: 
 
H2 Ceteris paribus, the likelihood of the directors choosing a voluntary 
audit increases with perceptions that the audit provides a check on 
accounting records and systems. 
H3 Ceteris paribus, the likelihood of the directors choosing a voluntary 
audit increases with perceptions that the audit improves the quality of 
the financial information. 
H4 Ceteris paribus, the likelihood of the directors choosing a voluntary 
audit increases with perceptions that the audit improves the credibility 
of the financial information. 
H5 Ceteris paribus, the likelihood of the directors choosing a voluntary 
audit increases with perceptions that the audit has a positive effect on 
the company’s credit rating score. 
H6 Ceteris paribus, the likelihood of the directors choosing a voluntary 
audit increases if they have a degree, a professional/vocational 
qualification or have studied/trained in business or management 
subjects. 
 
The last three hypotheses relate to agency factors: 
 
H7 Ceteris paribus, the likelihood of the directors choosing a voluntary 
audit increases if they are not wholly family owned. 
H8 Ceteris paribus, the likelihood of the directors choosing a voluntary 
audit increases if they have external shareholders without access to 
internal financial information. 
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H9 Ceteris paribus, the likelihood of the directors choosing a voluntary 
audit increases if they give a copy of their statutory accounts to the 
bank and other providers of finance. 
 
These theoretical propositions are tested using logistic regression.  The general model is: 
 
Voluntary audit decision = f (size, management factors, agency factors) 
 
3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Sample selection and data collection 
 
The study was designed as a postal questionnaire survey of the directors of unlisted, 
private limited companies across all industries and regions in the UK.  In March 2003, a 
list of private limited companies that had filed full accounts for 2002 was drawn from 
FAME
5
 across all industries and regions of Great Britain.  As a proxy for qualifying as 
small under the EU maxima at the time of the study, the sample was selected on the basis 
of the company meeting all three of the following criteria in the 2002 accounts: 
 
 turnover not exceeding £4.8m; 
 balance sheet total not exceeding £2.4m; 
 up to 50 employees. 
 
This resulted in a list of 3,202 companies that represented the population of companies of 
this size filing full accounts last year.
6
  Dormant companies, subsidiaries, groups and 
holding companies were removed in order to retain only active independent companies 
where financial reporting decisions would not be influenced by group policy.  In addition, 
companies that had not disclosed a director’s name were eliminated to improve the 
response rate. 
 
The questionnaire (see extract in appendix) was developed and piloted by conducting 
three interviews with auditors with small company clients and five with directors of small 
companies.  The questionnaire was then reviewed by a number of experienced researchers 
before being posted to a named director, together with an accompanying letter and 
prepaid envelope in April 2003.  In order to increase the response rate, a reminder was 
sent in May enclosing another copy of the questionnaire and prepaid envelope, as 
suggested by Kervin (1992).  A further group of companies was eliminated at this stage as 
they had ceased trading, moved away or the owner was absent/unable to participate.  This 
reduced the list to 2,633 companies.  By the cut-off date of 28
th
 May 2003, 790 usable 
replies had been received, giving a response rate of 30%. 
 
3.2 Response rate 
 
It has already been mentioned that the exact number of companies that qualify as small is 
not known, as there is no sampling frame that defines companies according to the 
Companies Act criteria.  However, using the category 0 – 49 employees as a proxy, 
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 A database that contains up to 10 years’ information on British companies registered at Companies House 
(one month after the accounts are filed), including more than 2.3m private companies of all sizes. 
6
 Companies filing abbreviated accounts do not disclose all three figures and, therefore, were not 
represented in the sample. 
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government statistics show that the population of small companies totals 873,320 (SBS, 
2003, Table 2).  The size of the sample (790) is sufficient to represent the population, as it 
greatly exceeds the minimum acceptable sample size of 384 for a population of this size 
(Krejcie and Morgan, 1970, p. 608). 
 
Tests for non-response bias found that non-respondents were likely to have been smaller 
in terms of number of employees.  This indicates that the sample contained fewer 
companies with no employees or very few employees compared with the population.  
However, in terms of turnover and balance sheet total, the results showed that the sample 
was representative of the body of companies from which it was drawn. 
 
3.3 Respondents 
 
The intention of the study was to capture the views of the directors and in 94% of cases 
the questionnaire was answered by the principal director, finance director or company 
secretary.  The position and the educational profiles of the respondents suggested they 
would have both tacit and formal knowledge with which to answer the questions and 
weigh up the costs and benefits of the audit when making the audit decision. 
 
As in the wider population, the majority of the sample companies were at the smaller end 
of scale in terms of ownership and size.  The vast majority (90%) had between one and 
four shareholders.  In terms of size, 80% had a maximum turnover of £1m in their 2002 
accounts, 89% had a maximum balance sheet total of £1.4m, and 78% had between 0 and 
10 employees. 
 
3.4 Variables in the analysis 
 
Table 2 summarises the variables in the analysis and Table 3 provides descriptive 
statistics where appropriate.
7
  Data relating to the size variables was obtained from the 
companies’ 2002 accounts.  All other data was collected via the questionnaire survey in 
2003 (non-responses were excluded from the analysis). 
 
                                                 
7
 Strictly speaking, the mean cannot be calculated for ordinal data, since the numeric scale represents 
ranked nominal categories.  It is given here as an indication of central tendency.  The multivariate statistics 
were based on ranked data. 
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Table 2 Description of variables 
 
Label Description Expected 
Sign 
Hypothesis 
tested 
VOLAUDIT Whether the company would have a voluntary audit 
(1 = yes, 0 = no) 
Dependent variable 
TOVER Size of company as measured by turnover (£m) Positive H1 
ASSETS Size of company as measured by balance sheet total (£m) Positive H1 
EMPLS Size of company as measured by number of employees Positive H1 
CHECK Extent of agreement that the audit provides a check on 
accounting records and systems (1 = disagree, 5 = agree) 
Positive H2 
QUALITY Extent of agreement that the audit improves the quality of the 
financial information (1 = disagree, 5 = agree) 
Positive H3 
CREDIBLY Extent of agreement that the audit improves the credibility of 
the financial information (1 = disagree, 5 = agree) 
Positive H4 
CREDITSC* Extent of agreement that the audit has a positive effect on the 
company’s credit rating score 
Positive H5 
EDUCATN Whether the respondent has a degree, professional/vocational 
qualification or has studied or trained in business/ 
management subjects (1 = yes, 0 = no) 
Positive H6 
FAMILY Whether the company is wholly family-owned (1 = yes, 0 = 
no) 
Negative H7 
EXOWNERS* Whether the company has shareholders without access to 
internal financial information (1 = yes, 0 = no) 
Positive H8 
BANK Whether the statutory accounts are given to the bank and 
other providers of finance (1 = yes, 0 = no) 
Positive H9 
 
* These variables extend the model by Collis et al. (2004). 
 
Table 3 Descriptive statistics 
 
Label Data Coding N Min Max Mean SD 
VOLAUDIT Nominal 1, 0 772 0 1 N/A N/A 
TOVER Ratio N/A 790 .054 4738.27 691.07 1119.45 
ASSETS Ratio N/A 790 .004 2391.79 386.22 584.18 
EMPLS Ratio N/A 790 1 50 8.13 10.479 
CHECK Ordinal 1 – 5 697 1 5 4.05 1.19 
QUALITY Ordinal 1 – 5 687 1 5 3.35 1.38 
CREDIBLY Ordinal 1 – 5 688 1 5 3.95 1.18 
CREDITSC Ordinal 1 – 5 681 1 5 3.55 1.29 
EDUCATN Nominal 1, 0 790 0 1 N/A N/A 
FAMILY Nominal 1, 0 785 0 1 N/A N/A 
EXOWNERS Nominal 1, 0 722 0 1 N/A N/A 
BANK Nominal 1, 0 790 0 1 N/A N/A 
 
 VOLAUDIT (question 14 in the questionnaire) is the dependent variable.  It consists 
of two groups: companies that would have a voluntary audit (coded 1) and companies 
that would not have the accounts audited if exempt (coded 0). 
 TOVER measures turnover, ASSETS measures balance sheet total and EMPLS 
measures the average number of employees disclosed in the 2002 statutory accounts.  
Data for TOVER and ASSETS were converted from £k to £m to aid the interpretation 
of the results.  These size variables are used to test H1 and are expected to be 
positively associated with the demand for the audit. 
 CHECK, QUALITY, CREDIBLY and CREDITSC represent management factors and 
capture whether the directors perceive the audit as providing a check on accounting 
records and systems, improving the quality or the credibility of the financial 
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information or having a positive effect on the company’s credit rating score (questions 
15a, 15c, 15d and 15h respectively).  They are coded on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = 
disagree and 5 = agree with the statement.  CREDITSC is an additional factor that 
was identified during the preliminary interviews.  These variables are expected to be 
positively associated with the demand for the audit and are used to test H2 – H5. 
 EDUCATN is a proxy for management’s knowledge of the costs and benefits of the 
audit (question 23).  It is a dummy variable that is coded 1 if the respondent has a 
degree, professional/vocational qualification or has studied or trained in 
business/management subjects, and 0 if not.  It is expected to be positively associated 
with the demand for the audit and is used to test H6. 
 FAMILY is an agency factor and captures family ownership (question 1).  It is a 
dummy variable that is coded 1 if the company is wholly family-owned and 0 if not.  
It is expected to be negatively associated with the demand for the audit and is used to 
test H7. 
 EXOWNERS is additional agency factor that was identified during the preliminary 
interviews for the study and captures external ownership (question 3).  It is a dummy 
variable that is coded 1 if there are shareholders without access to internal financial 
information and 0 if not.  It is expected to be positively associated with the demand 
for the audit and is used to test H8. 
 BANK is an agency factor and captures whether the statutory accounts are given to 
the bank and other providers of finance (question 18).  It is a dummy variable that is 
coded 1 if the company gives the statutory accounts to the bank and lenders and 0 if 
not.  It is expected to be positively associated with the demand for the audit and is 
used to test H9. 
   
3.5 Multicollinearity 
 
The data was examined for collinearity by examining a correlation matrix of the ordinal 
and ratio variables.
8
  Although none of the correlation coefficients shown in Table 4 
indicate very high correlation (≥ 0.9), the high results for the size variables (0.7 - 0.89) 
give some cause for concern.  This is because high levels of correlation make it hard to 
identify the predictive power of individual variables and increase the probability that a 
good predictor of an outcome will be found non-significant (Kervin, 1992). 
 
Table 4 Correlation matrix of ratio and ordinal independent variables 
 
  TOVER ASSETS EMPS CHECK QUALITY CREDIBLY CREDITSC 
TOVER 1.000       
ASSETS 0.802** 1.000      
EMPS 0.766** 0.718** 1.000     
CHECK 0.100** 0.096* 0.109** 1.000    
QUALITY 0.105** 0.072 0.079* 0.626** 1.000   
CREDIBLY 0.165** 0.171** 0.157** 0.621** 0.661** 1.000  
CREDITSC 0.192** 0.161** 0.178** 0.504** 0.532** 0.554** 1.000 
 
Notes: N = 671 – 790 (cases excluded pairwise)  
 See Table 2 for a description of the variables 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
                                                 
8
 EDUCATN, FAMILY, EXOWNERS and BANK are not suitable for this procedure as they are measured 
on a nominal scale. 
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*   Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
4. Results and discussion 
 
4.1 Univariate and bivariate analysis 
 
In 74% of companies all the shareholders had access to internal financial information, 
which implies that these companies were owner-managed, and 68% of the sample 
companies were wholly family-owned.  This suggests that there is potential for 
information asymmetry among shareholders in up to one-third of small companies. 
 
A large proportion of companies (44%) had external funding in addition to share capital 
and retained profit.  The most widely used source of external finance was the bank (used 
by 69% of companies) and 51% of companies give a copy of their statutory accounts to 
the bank and other providers of finance.  In 27% of companies the bank and other 
providers of finance had requested the 2002 accounts to be audited and in 30% of 
companies the shareholders had requested the audit. 
 
Using a maximum turnover of £1m as a proxy for eligibility for audit exemption, analysis 
of the 2002 accounts of the 633 companies in this category shows that 58% had taken up 
exemption and the remaining 42% had not.  The main reason given for not having the 
accounts audited was lower accountancy fees, but very few directors were able to provide 
details of the specific amount saved.  The mode for the 43 that reported specific savings 
was £1,000, which would appear to be valid as it matches the modal audit fee disclosed in 
the 2002 accounts. These fees charged in the 2002 accounts ranged from £114 to £19,000, 
but it is likely that these figures are estimates, as it was apparent from the preliminary 
interviews with auditors that incomplete accounting records are fairly common in small 
firms and therefore there is considerable overlap in preparing the year-end figures and 
checking source documents and systems of control, which are part of the audit. 
 
The proposal to raise the audit exemption threshold to £4.8m was supported by 57% of 
respondents.  If they became eligible for exemption, 56% of companies intended to take 
up exemption and 42% would not (2% did not respond).
9
  There are some reservations on 
basing an analysis on predicted behaviour, but in this case it can be justified, as the 
directors’ forecasts are almost identical to their decisions in the 2002 accounts. 
 
4.2 Preliminary tests 
 
Mann-Whitney tests of difference were conducted to establish the independence of the 
two groups in the dependent variable VOLAUDIT (those that would have a voluntary 
audit and those that would not) and the independent variables measured on a non-
parametric ratio scale (TOVER, ASSETS, EMPLS) or ordinal scale (CHECK, 
QUALITY, CREDIBLY, CREDITSC).  The results in Table 5 provide evidence of a 
significant difference in each test (p < 0.01). 
 
                                                 
9
 The vast majority of companies (79%) that were likely to be eligible for the first time predicted they 
would have a voluntary audit. 
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Table 5 Demand for a voluntary audit: Mann-Whitney tests 
 
Variable VOLAUDIT N Mean 
rank 
Sum of 
ranks 
Mann- 
Whitney U 
Wilcoxon 
W 
Z p 
TOVER 0 No 438 311.29 136344.50     
 1 Yes 334 485.13 162033.50     
 Total 772   40203.50 136344.50 -10.731 0.000 
ASSETS 0 No 438 309.19 135426.00     
 1 Yes 334 487.88 162952.00     
 Total 772   39285.00 135426.00 -11.030 0.000 
EMPLS 0 No 438 314.20 137618.00     
 1 Yes 334 481.32 160760.00     
 Total 772   41477.00 137618.00 -10.459 0.000 
CHECK 0 No 362 285.45 103332.00     
 1 Yes 320 404.91 129571.00     
 Total 682   37629.00 103332.00   -8.519 0.000 
QUALITY 0 No 356 268.62   95629.00     
 1 Yes 316 412.97 130499.00     
 Total 672   32083.00   95629.00   -9.864 0.000 
CREDIBLY 0 No 358 278.17   99584.00     
 1 Yes 315 403.86 127217.00     
 Total 673   35323.00   99584.00   -8.851 0.000 
CREDITSC 0 No 355 273.52   97100.00     
 1 Yes 312 402.81 125678.00     
 Total 667   33910.00   97100.00   -8.928 0.000 
 
Chi-square tests were used to measure the association between the two groups in the 
dependent variable (VOLAUDIT) and each independent variable measured on a 
dichotomous nominal scale (FAMILY, EXOWNERS, BANK, EDUCATN).  Table 6 
provides evidence of a significant positive association for FAMILY, EXOWNERS and 
BANK (p < 0.01).  However, the result for EDUCATN is not significant (p > 0.05), 
which provides evidence to reject H6. 
 
Table 6 Chi-square tests on nominal independent variables 
 
Variable Code VOLAUDIT 
0 No          1 Yes 
N Chi-square df p 
FAMILY 0 No 102 144 246    
 1 Yes 331 190 521    
 Total 433 334 767 33.103 1 0.000 
EXOWNERS 0 No 351 235 586    
 1 Yes   47   73 120    
 Total 398 308 706 17.406 1 0.000 
BANK 0 No 264 116 380    
 1 Yes 174 218 392    
 Total 438 334 772 49.468 1 0.000 
EDUCATN 0 No 124 105 229    
 1 Yes 314 229 543    
 Total 438 334 772    0.888 1 0.346 
 
4.3 Size models 
 
Replicating Collis, Jarvis and Skerratt (2004), Table 7 examines a series of size models 
for TOVER, ASSETS and EMPS as audit predictors.  It can be seen from Panels A - C 
that when each variable is regressed separately, the result is significant (p < 0.01).  
However, when all three are entered together (Panel D) EMPS is not significant (p > 
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0.05), which provides evidence to reject H1 in terms of employees.  The results for 
TOVER and ASSETS are significant (p < 0.01).  However, TOVER has a higher Wald 
statistic, which suggests it is the more powerful predictor, and a lower probability 
statistic, which gives more confidence that the result is not due to error.  This requires 
some interpretation, given the high level of correlation between these variables (see Table 
4).  Turnover represents the cost burden in the model.  Turnover is a measure of activity 
and the higher the activity, the more complex the organisation is likely to be and, hence, 
the higher the auditing fees.  At the same time, the higher the activity, the more likely it is 
that having the accounts audited will benefit management by providing assurance to 
creditors and customers.  Thus, the larger the turnover, the lower the relative cost.  To 
some extent, it can be argued that turnover also captures whether the company is large 
enough to have external or non-family shareholders and external borrowings.  However, 
agency relationships (especially those with lenders) are better explained by ASSETS, as 
the fixed asset element within the balance sheet total represents size of resources as well 
as collateral against borrowings.
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Table 7 
Logistic regression model of demand for a voluntary audit: size factors 
 
Variable B SE Wald df p Exp(B) 
Panel A       
TOVER        0.834 0.097 73.909 1 0.000 2.302 
Constant  -0.790 0.092 74.183 1 0.000 0.454 
Panel B       
ASSETS    1.380 0.158 75.940 1 0.000 3.976 
Constant  -0.780 0.092 71.151 1 0.000 0.459 
Panel C       
EMPLS   0.077 0.009 66.814 1 0.000 1.080 
Constant -0.863 0.100 74.415 1 0.000 0.422 
Panel D       
TOVER       0.449 0.153   8.606 1 0.003 1.566 
ASSETS   0.479 0.236   4.119 1 0.042 1.615 
EMPLS   0.023 0.013   2.884 1 0.089 1.023 
Constant -0.902 0.102 78.716 1 0.000 0.406 
 
Notes: N = 772 
Model summaries: 
Panel A Chi-square 112.648, df 1, p < 0.01, -2 Log likelihood 943.518, Nagelkerke R
2
 0.182 
Panel B Chi-square 99.348, df 1, p < 0.01, -2 Log likelihood 956.818, Nagelkerke R
2
 0.162 
Panel C Chi-square 91.756, df 1, p < 0.01, -2 Log likelihood 964.410, Nagelkerke R
2
 0.150 
Panel D Chi-square 121.628, df 3, p < 0.01, -2 Log likelihood 934.538, Nagelkerke R
2
 0.196 
 
4.4 Sufficiency of size variables as surrogates 
 
The models shown in Table 8 extend the Collis et al. (2004) study by examining the 
sufficiency of the size variables TOVER and ASSETS as surrogates for the management 
and agency factors respectively in the demand for voluntary audit.  Panel A shows the 
result of testing H1 (using TOVER) in conjunction with H7 – H9 (FAMILY, 
EXOWNERS and BANK).  The results for all variables are significant (p < 0.05).   
 
                                                 
10
 Although some fixed assets are sector sensitive (for example, construction and manufacturing companies 
are more likely to have plant and machinery; manufacturing and trading companies are more likely to carry 
stock), ownership of land and buildings is not industry specific.  
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Panel B shows the results of replacing TOVER with the variables representing the 
management factors, thus testing H2 – H6 (CHECK, QUALITY, CREDIBLY, 
CREDITSC) in conjunction with H7 – H9 (FAMILY, EXOWNERS and BANK).  The 
probability statistic for CREDIBLY is not significant (p > 0.05), which provides evidence 
to reject H4.  However, the remaining variables are significant (p < 0.01) and the factor 
coefficient (B) for FAMILY indicates the expected negative relationship with the DV.  
The notes to the table show that the model in Panel A has a R
2
 of 23%, compared to 35% 
for the model in Panel B.  This indicates that the inclusion of specific management factors 
in Panel B improves the goodness of fit of the model and suggests that TOVER is not a 
sufficient proxy for these factors. 
 
Panel C shows the results of replacing the agency variables in Panel B with ASSETS, 
thus testing H2 – H6 (CHECK, QUALITY, CREDIBLY, CREDITSC) in conjunction 
with H1 (using ASSETS).  The probability statistic for CREDIBLY is not significant (p > 
0.05), which again provides evidence to reject H4.  However, the remaining variables are 
significant (p < 0.01) and the notes to the table show that this model has a R
2
 of 34%, 
compared to 35% for the model in Panel B.  This indicates that the inclusion of specific 
agency factors in Panel B improves the goodness of fit of the model and suggests that 
ASSETS is not a sufficient proxy for these factors. 
 
Table 8 
Logistic regression model of demand for a voluntary audit: 
Sufficiency of size as a surrogate for management and agency factors 
 
Variable B SE Wald df p Exp(B) 
Panel A       
TOVER       0.660 0.106 38.651 1 0.000 1.936 
FAMILY -0.709 0.179 15.763 1 0.000 0.492 
EXOWNERS   0.527 0.228   5.318 1 0.021 1.693 
BANK   0.456 0.181   6.317 1 0.012 1.577 
Constant -0.523 0.181   8.401 1 0.004 0.592 
Panel B       
CHECK 0.238 0.118 4.073 1 0.044 1.269 
QUALITY 0.356 0.099 12.935 1 0.000 1.428 
CREDIBLY 0.163 0.123 1.767 1 0.184 1.178 
CREDITSC 0.297 0.094 10.100 1 0.001 1.346 
FAMILY -0.869 0.206 17.715 1 0.000 0.420 
EXOWNERS 0.795 0.262 9.211 1 0.002 2.214 
BANK 0.924 0.195 22.393 1 0.000 2.519 
Constant -4.128 0.535 59.490 1 0.000 0.016 
Panel C       
CHECK 0.233 0.112 4.317 1 0.038 1.262 
QUALITY 0.374 0.096 15.093 1 0.000 1.453 
CREDIBLY 0.117 0.119 0.970 1 0.325 1.124 
CREDITSC 0.231 0.089 6.810 1 0.009 1.260 
ASSETS 1.221 0.176 47.967 1 0.000 3.389 
Constant -4.138 0.459 81.149 1 0.000 0.016 
 
Notes: N = 599 
Model summaries: 
Panel A Chi-square 135.316, df 4, p < 0.01, -2 Log likelihood 831.903, Nagelkerke R
2
 0.234 
Panel B Chi-square 181.600, df 7, p < 0.01, -2 Log likelihood 647.185, Nagelkerke R
2
 0.349 
Panel C Chi-square 189.021, df 5, p < 0.01, -2 Log likelihood 711.872, Nagelkerke R
2
 0.336  
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4.5 Size, management and agency factors 
 
Table 9 shows the final model, which tests H1 (using TOVER and ASSETS) with H2, H3 
and H5 (the remaining management variables CHECK, QUALITY and CREDITSC) and 
H7 – H9 (the agency variables FAMILY, EXOWNERS and BANK).  The results for 
ASSETS are not significant (p > 0.05), which gives grounds to reject H1 in terms of 
balance sheet total.  The results for the remaining variables are significant (p < 0.05) and 
the factor coefficient (B) for FAMILY has the expected negative sign.  This provides 
evidence to accept H1 in terms of turnover, H2, H3, H5 and H7 – H9.  The higher values 
of the Wald statistics and the lower probability statistics for QUALITY and FAMILY 
compared to the other variables demonstrate that these are the most influential predictors.  
Examining the goodness of fit, it can be seen from the R
2
 that this model explains 39% of 
the demand for the audit, which is an improvement over the models shown in Table 8.   
 
Table 9 
Logistic regression model of demand for a voluntary audit: 
size, management and agency factors 
 
Variable B SE Wald df p Exp(B) 
TOVER 0.368 0.170 4.700 1 0.030 1.444 
ASSETS 0.439 0.287 2.332 1 0.127 1.551 
CHECK 0.293 0.117 6.239 1 0.012 1.340 
QUALITY 0.450 0.096 21.756 1 0.000 1.568 
CREDITSC 0.257 0.094 7.485 1 0.006 1.293 
FAMILY -0.777 0.211 13.565 1 0.000 0.460 
EXOWNERS 0.587 0.267 4.826 1 0.028 1.799 
BANK 0.429 0.216 3.944 1 0.047 1.536 
Constant -4.045 0.516 61.491 1 0.000 0.018 
 
Notes: N = 602 
 Model summary: 
Chi-square 209.273, df 8, p < 0.01, -2 Log likelihood 623.574, Nagelkerke R
2
 0.392 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This study is based on a survey 790 companies in 2003 with a turnover up to £4.8m.  It 
extends the findings of Collis et al., 2004, which was based on data collected in 1999 
from 385 companies with a turnover up to £4.2m.  It is clear from both studies that 
company directors in the UK are divided on the costs versus benefits of voluntary audit.  
In the present study, 57% supported the proposal to raise the turnover threshold to £4.8m, 
yet 42% predicted that they would have a voluntary audit if they became exempt.  The 
validity of their predictions is strengthened by the fact that the figures match the 
proportion of currently eligible companies (those with a maximum turnover of £1m) that 
chose a voluntary audit in 2002.  Among those that would be eligible to choose for the 
first time, it is likely that the vast majority (79%) will have a voluntary audit.  This will be 
reassuring to small practitioners who rely on audit fee income from small company 
clients.  It will also be reassuring to banks, lenders and other creditors who rely on the 
audited financial statements for assessing and monitoring risk. 
 
This study provides evidence on the adequacy of different size measures as surrogates for 
the costs versus benefits of external audit, and extends our knowledge of the qualitative 
factors.  The results show that the likelihood of the directors choosing a voluntary audit 
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increases with turnover (but not balance sheet total).  In addition, three management 
factors were identified: perceptions that the audit provides a check on accounting records 
and systems, improves the quality of the financial information and has a positive effect on 
the company’s credit rating score.  Agency relationships with non-family shareholders, 
external shareholders and lenders were also significant factors.  The most influential 
predictors are the belief that the audit improves the quality of the financial information 
and companies that are not wholly family-owned.  Beliefs about the beneficial effect of 
the audit on the company’s credit rating score and its role in providing assurance to 
external shareholders represent two additional influences on the audit decision not 
identified in previous research. 
 
A general interpretation of the results is that directors who are willing to bear the cost of 
the audit do so because of their beliefs about the net benefits to the company and the role 
the audited accounts play in reducing the cost of capital and supporting agency 
relationships where there is information asymmetry.  However, the specific findings 
should be of particular interest to policy-makers.  Since lenders and creditors have the 
economic power to ensure that their needs are met, it is important that the regulators 
protect the needs of shareholder requiring the additional assurance of an independent 
audit.  Harmonisation with EU size thresholds means that the enlarged category of small 
companies in the UK contains two subgroups with differing needs.  This is demonstrated 
by the significant proportion of directors whose audit decisions indicate that the benefits 
outweigh the costs.  Although turnover is a factor, qualitative characteristics are more 
important and these qualities should be taken into account during the development of 
little GAAP at national and international levels.    
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Appendix 
Extract of questionnaire showing variables analysed 
 
 
1. Is the company a family-owned business? (Tick one box only) 
Wholly family-owned  (1) 
Partly family-owned  (2) 
None of the shareholders are related  (0) 
 
3. How many shareholders (owners) does the company have? 
(a) Total number of shareholders   
     Breakdown:   
(b) Number of shareholders with access to internal financial information   
(c) Number of shareholders without access to internal financial information   
 
11. If the statutory accounts were not audited last year but were audited previously, have overall 
accountancy costs decreased? 
No  (0) 
Yes, by approximately                                                                                                     £          
 
13. Do you think the turnover threshold for exemption from the statutory audit should be increased 
from £1m to £4.8m? 
(Tick one box only) 
Yes, increase to £4.8m  (1) 
No, stay at £1m  (0) 
Other                                                                                                                             £m         
 
14. Would you have the accounts audited even if the company were not legally required to do so? 
(Tick one box only) 
Yes, the accounts are already audited voluntarily  (1) 
Yes, the accounts would be audited voluntarily  (2) 
No  (0) 
 
Please give reasons for either answer 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
……………….……………………………………………………………………………………………... 
 
15. What are your views on the following statements regarding the audit? 
(Circle the number closest to your view) 
 Agree                                           Disagree 
(a) Provides a check on accounting records and systems 5 4 3 2 1 
(b) Helps protect against fraud 5 4 3 2 1 
(c) Improves the quality of the financial information 5 4 3 2 1 
(d) Improves the credibility of the financial information 5 4 3 2 1 
(e) Provides assurance to shareholders 5 4 3 2 1 
(f) Provides assurance to the bank and other lenders 5 4 3 2 1 
(g) Provides assurance to suppliers and trade creditors 5 4 3 2 1 
(h) Has a positive effect on company’s credit rating score 5 4 3 2 1 
Other (please state) 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
……………….……………………………………………………………………………………………... 
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18. Apart from Companies House, who normally receives a copy of the company’s statutory 
accounts? 
(Tick as many boxes as apply) 
(a) Shareholders   
(b) Bank and other providers of finance   
(c) Directors/managers who are not shareholders   
(d) Employees who are not shareholders   
(e) Major suppliers and trade creditors   
(f) Major customers   
(g) Inland Revenue   
Other (please state)   
 
........................................................................................................................................... 
  
 
19. If the accounts were audited last year, is it because any of the following users requested it? 
(Tick as many boxes as apply) 
(a) Shareholders   
(b) Bank and other providers of finance   
(c) Major suppliers and trade creditors   
(d) Major customers   
(e) Inland Revenue   
Other (please state)   
 
........................................................................................................................................... 
  
 
20. Apart from capital invested by the shareholders and retained profit, is the company currently 
financed by any of the following? 
(Tick as many boxes as apply) 
(a) Personal loans from family or friends.   
(b) Bank finance   
(c) Business angel capital   
(d) Venture capital   
(e) Leasing   
(f) Hire purchase   
(g) Factoring   
Other (please state)   
 
........................................................................................................................................... 
  
 
22. What is your position in the company? 
(Tick one box only) 
The sole director  (1) 
The principal director (eg managing director or chief executive)  (2) 
The finance director   (3) 
Other (please state)   
 
........................................................................................................................................... 
  
 
23. Do you have any of the following qualifications/training? 
(Tick as many boxes as apply) 
(a) Undergraduate or postgraduate degree   
(b) Professional/vocational qualification   
(c) Study/training in business or management subjects   
 
 
 
